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Abstract
This article combines a brief introduction into a particular philosophical
theory of ‘time’ with a demonstration of how this theory has been
implemented in a Literary Studies oriented Humanities Computing project.
The aim of the project was to create a model of text-based time cognition
and design customized markup and text analysis tools that help to
understand ‘‘how time works’’: more precisely, how narratively organised and
communicated information motivates readers to generate the mental image of
a chronologically organized world. The approach presented is based on the
unitary model of time originally proposed by McTaggart, who distinguished
between two perspectives onto time, the so-called A- and B-series. The first
step towards a functional Humanities Computing implementation of this
theoretical approach was the development of TempusMarker—a software tool
providing automatic and semi-automatic markup routines for the tagging
of temporal expressions in natural language texts. In the second step we
discuss the principals underlying TempusParser—an analytical tool that can
re-construct temporal order in events by way of an algorithm-driven process
of analysis and recombination of textual segments during which the ‘time
stamp’ of each segment as indicated by the temporal tags is interpreted.
..................................................................................................................................
For many of us the fictional worlds, which we encounter via media of
narrative representation—worlds depicted in novels, novellas, fairy
tales, movies, dramas, operas etc.—regularly match and often even
surpass reality in terms of their emotional effect. Paradoxically as it
may seem we must be willing to suspend the very ontologic constraint
that defines reality in order to experience this super-realistic pleasure of
immersion: we have to accept that the things and events occurring
in a fictional world need not necessarily exist in any empirical sense.
Accordingly, we have become accustomed to assuming that the persons
and objects that populate these worlds will probably have no reality
outside the narrative, and we are aware that their spatial and historical
dimensions are by default imaginary. In other words, we know that
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up. Yet this does not matter in the least bit: by aesthetic convention
fictional worlds can be referentially void for as long as they are
meaningful and relevant and allow us to relate our own life experiences
to what goes on inside them. After all, the fictional world is presented
to us as a probable alternative and not as a replica of the empirical
world in which we ourselves exist; in short, it is a virtual, a possible
world.
1
Yet there is one particular aspect of empirical reality, which
even these possible worlds will never be exempt from: time. One can
refer to fictional space, persons, objects and events in a purely abstract
manner and conceive them as mere possibilities, or as logic, semiotic
or functional variables.
2 But the experience of time will retain
its phenomenological reality even in a fictional context, if nothing
else because of the fact that our cognitive processing of imagined
objects and events nevertheless takes real time. Conversely, it is almost
impossible to conceive of time independent from experience, a philo-
sophical problem discussed already by Augustine toward the end of the
4th century in his autobiographic Confessiones. After contemplating the
timeless existence of God, Augustine exclaimed:
For what is time? Who can easily and briefly explain it? Who can
even comprehend it in thought or put the answer into words? Yet
is it not true that in conversation we refer to nothing more
familiarly or knowingly than time? And surely we understand it
when we speak of it; we understand it also when we hear another
speak of it.—What, then, is time? If no one asks me, I know what
it is. If I wish to explain it to him who asks me, I do not know.
Yet I say with confidence that I know that if nothing passed
away, there would be no past time; and if nothing were still
coming, there would be no future time; and if there were nothing
at all, there would be no present time.—But, then, how is it that
there are the two times, past and future, when even the past is
now no longer and the future is now not yet? But if the present
were always present, and did not pass into past time, it obviously
would not be time but eternity. If, then, time present—if it be
time—comes into existence only because it passes into time past,
how can we say that even this is, since the cause of its being is
that it will cease to be? Thus, can we not truly say that time is
only as it tends toward nonbeing?
Augustine (1955): Book XI, Chapter 14
Note that Augustine referred to the philosophical conundrum of real
world time experience, that is, to the cognitive phenomenon of things
coming and passing away, which on the one hand seems to testify to
time’s existence, while on the other hand splitting up time into three
separate ontological domains (future, present, past). These delibera-
tions of course focused as much on the epistemological as on the
spiritual aspect of time perception.
3 Gaining insight into how time
1 On narrative representations
as ‘possible worlds’ see Ryan
(1991).
2 See for example the Formalist
notion of ‘function’ introduced
by Propp (1984), which was
meant to replace the naı ¨ve
mimetic concept of ‘character’.
This functionalist approach of
course goes way back to
Aristotle’s Poetics.
3 Ricoeur (1984) commences
his study on the interrelation
of time and narrative with a
comprehensive interpretation
of the quoted passage. For a
detailed critique of Ricoeur’s
approach see Protevi (1999).
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Augustine’s metaphysical problem of defining and understanding
time as such. But apart from this evident difference in scope and
profoundness there is also a methodological distinction to be kept in
mind. Unlike Augustine, but also unlike modern natural sciences
contemporary literary studies generally focus on the represented rather
than on the empirical, a methodological orientation that in fact has
a bearing on most humanities disciplines’ conceptualizations of time.
4
In this perspective time occurs as a by-product, a function or a con-
stituent of cognitive processes rather than as their perceptual object.
By contrast, the natural sciences (unless they consciously decide to
transcend the Newtonian paradigm for the sake of refining increasingly
abstract theoretical models of the physical world), and even more so the
applied sciences, usually accept as an unproblematic given the objective
existence of time as a metre for assessing the fourth, i.e. the temporal
dimension of natural processes and occurrences. The problem that one
cannot ‘see’ time as such, that it is inference based and not directly
empirical of course remains, but the case is not really different from
that of, say, magnetism or gravity which, too, only become apparent by
their effects, but are nevertheless deemed to be objective facts or forces.
Both are generally conceptualized as an attraction between objects
located in space. Significantly, our favourite metaphor for expressing
the notion of objective time is also based on a spatial analogy, namely
that of the time-line or time-arrow.
5
However, the assumed objectivity of time is immediately called into
question once one takes the perceiving consciousness into the equation,
and the problem of how to conceptualize time gets even more complex
when we deal with a consciousness processing symbolic rather than
sensory data. Yet the striking fact remains that even represented time—
that is, time cognition as it is evoked in our minds by representational
means, and among these first and foremost by narratives—feels
perfectly real. We read a story and in that story certain events unfold
sequentially. Clearly, there seems to be some temporal order in this
sequence, and hence we will conclude that time does exist in the world
depicted in this particular representation. How exactly does this
illusion come about?
This question is at the core of the ongoing research project, which
this article will present.
6 Our aim is to develop a new model of
narrative time, or more precisely: a model that will enable us to
describe how and on the basis of which textual cues readers of narrative
texts build the complex mental image of a temporally structured world.
We have termed the outcome of this readerly activity the temporality
effect, thereby alluding to Barthes’ (1989) famous notion of the
so-called reality effect. However, our narratological project equally falls
into the domain of humanities computing in that the methodology
of textual mark-up, data modelling, combinatorial data analysis and
computer-aided visualization of time constructs play a crucial role in it.
From this perspective our project’s basic methodological assumptions
4 See Sandbothe (1988) and
Dowden (2003) for an
overview and a discussion of
contemporary approaches to
‘time’ in science and
philosophy.
5 On the prevalence of spatial
metaphors in the
conceptualisation of time see
Engberg-Pedersen (1999).
6 Updated information on
the project is available at
http://www.narratology.net/
html/de005.html
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temporal modelling project, and one of its components (the so-called
‘B-algorithm’; see below) bears strong resemblance to Burg et al. (2000)
constraint logic programming approach toward chronological analysis
of narratives. However, what sets our model apart from these
approaches is its foundation in a particular philosophy of time,
which integrates non-temporal (sequential and logic) as well temporal
principles of ordering in phenomena, be they empirical or represented.
This unique combined perspective holds three important advantages.
One, it allows for the joint modelling of subjective time experience and
objective time structures. Two, because this philosophical approach
traces the experience of time back to the processing of purely
sequentially ordered information, it provides a strong conceptual
basis for a computational analysis of the temporality effect, which
focuses on the material of which narratives consists of in the most
literal sense: mere strings of words, which are inherently devoid of any
temporal quality. And thirdly, seen in combination these two
characteristics of our project’s philosophical foundation open up the
possibility of a dynamic 3D visualisation of time experience.
1 Narratological and Philosophical Tenets of
the Temporality Effect Model
Since the mid-1950s a number of well-established narrative theories
and narratological taxonomies have dealt in detail with time and
temporal ordering in narrative texts. Among the more recent and
influential are Ricoeur’s (1984–88) philosophically orientated Time
and Narrative and the narratological contributions by Genette (1980,
1988), notably his books Narrative Discourse and Narrative Discourse
Revisited. In these studies Genette outlines, among others, a well-
defined taxonomy for describing phenomena of temporal ordering in
narratives across the levels of story, plot and discourse. This taxonomy
is arguably the most widely used in contemporary narrative studies.
However, an aspect disregarded in Genette’s as in many other
narrative or narratological theories of representational time constructs
is that long before an ordered narratorial discourse takes shape, texts
are by default already assumed to be located ‘in time’ by their readers
simply because they are texts. A text as understood in the narrower
sense of the word is a symbolic representation made up of an ordered
string of characters. This characteristic of linear order in the arrange-
ment of representational material is subconsciously conflated with the
temporal linearity governing the processes by which that material is
produced (written) or received (read), and the empirical temporality
of these processes is then furthermore projected onto the represen-
tational content itself. The outcome of this naı ¨ve, pre-critical mode
of processing narratives is easy to predict—and almost impossible
to avoid. The unconscious mapping of objective temporal order
in cognitive processing onto logical order in the symbolic material,
J. C. Meister
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the phenomenon of iconic temporality (see Lehmann, 1992; Lehmann
and Rauchenecker, 1995).
7 It is probably a cultural rather than an
anthropological default that is most apparent in text-centred Western
cultures, a default by which we have come to assume that what has
been represented first in terms of the numerical order of characters or
words, and was thus encountered first in the chronological order of
our reading, did in fact happen in that order and took place within a
world that is structured in a temporal sense. Non-linear principles of
ordering—flashforwards, flashbacks, omissions etc. for which Genette
has re-coined rhetoric terms, such as analepsis, prolepsis, elipsis—are
hence described as second-order discursive techniques that result in
a digression from what one assumes to be the ‘natural’ or isochronic
representational order of a 1:1 relation among temporal order of events,
and sequential order in the representational material. The model, which
we are developing tries to take this iconographic dimension seriously,
and our starting point, therefore, is to reduce the concept of narrative
text to a dimension where it is not yet affected by temporality. This
dimension is that of the numerically ordered sequence of words (and
eventually, that of the mental images invoked by a certain class of
them), which we use as a reference axis in our approach.
A second important philosophical tenet of our model is derived
from Augustine and Husserl. Augustine’s unique contribution to
philosophy of time is the concept of the coexistent ‘threefold present’
(presence of the past, presence of the present, presence of the future)
in the human mind. This idea reappears in Husserl’s concept of the
so-called ‘Zeithof der Gegenwart’, best translated as the ‘time-window
of the now’, or in short, the now-window (Husserl 1966). According
to Husserl human consciousness is by necessity located within such
a subjective now-window, which knows no internal temporal dif-
ferentiation, but from within which we anticipate the future by way of
what Husserl calls ‘Protention’ (future-orientated imagination) and
‘Retention’ (past-orientated remembering; Husserl, 1985:34f. Both
concepts are based on Augustinian ideas, notably that of the distensio
animi as discussed in Ricoeur, 1984 ff). Husserl’s speculative idea of
the now-window has been supported by cognitive psychology and
neurobiological studies of human reading habits, which suggest that
in processing narrative texts, the average extension of a cognitive now-
window is about 3s, regardless of the fact that our sense of hearing
can actually individuate phenomena down to an astonishing 2ms.
8
In practical terms this means that when we read a text, whatever falls
within a 3s window of perception is by default experienced as
happening ‘now’, thereby constituting the impression of a present.
9
Whatever falls outside the boundaries of this window belongs to either
the future or the past. Of course, the now-window, although
measurable in its extensions, has no objective existence; it is just the
subjective manifestation of what James (1950) aptly termed the
‘specious present’.
7 Iconic temporality is also the
conceptual point of reference
in Mu ¨ller’s (1948) influential
distinction among Erza ¨hlzeit
(time or duration of narration)
and erza ¨hlte Zeit (the narrated
time; the fictional amount of
time taken up by the narrated
events). According to Mu ¨ller,
Erza ¨hlzeit can be measured
in terms of the quantity of
representational material,
i.e. the number of words and
pages, which the reader has
to process in order to build
up the mental image of a
fictional world. This number
can then be related to the
time, which the narrated
events are reported to have
taken within the narrated
world. ‘Fast’ and ‘slow’
modes of narration can thus
be distinguished by comparing
their respective ratios of
Erza ¨hlzeit to erza ¨hlte Zeit.
8 See Po ¨ppel (1978). Po ¨ppel
tested the ability of humans
to differentiate sensual
phenomena; the so-called
fusion threshold for acoustic
phenomena stands at 1–2ms
and constitutes the finest
level of granularity that we
are capable of handling. The
human ability to identify the
way in which these individual
phenomena are actually
ordered is far less pronounced;
here the phenomena have to be
at least some 20ms apart from
each other before any of our
senses will be able to identify
their ordering principle (the
so-called ordering threshold).—
On the 3 second extension of
the ‘window of cognition’ that
organizes human processing
of texts see Wittmann and
Po ¨ppel (1999).
9 This default can of course
be overridden by words or
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the three aspects of basic non-temporal numerical order, assumed
objective temporal linearity in the world, and subjective experience
of time as spreading out from a ‘now’-position is that of McTaggart
(1908). McTaggart proposed three concurrent ordering principles in
events. These principles are, in descending order,
(1) the C-line; that is, events in their objective non- or pretemporal
numerical or logical order;
(2) the B-line; that is, events ‘stringed’ in a continuous and absolute
sequence of empirical before/after-relations; and
(3) the A-line; that is, events in their subjectively experienced
dynamic relation toward an assumed ‘now’ from whose
perspective they are seen to pass through a continuum of three
temporal domains, namely past–present–future.
10
2 A- , B- and C-line Ordering in Practice:
the Role of the Temporal Operators
Our model combines the three McTaggart-lines with Husserl’s idea
of the now-window in order to define, in qualitative as well as in
quantitative terms, the empirical textual features that trigger the
temporality effect, that is, the reader’s experience of temporality as
an ordering principle at play in the represented world. We call these
textual features temporal operators. Our premise is that the only
empirical phenomenon, which we encounter in our processing of
narratives actually is the string of words that a given narrative consists
of. Certain subclasses of words (mainly nouns, pronouns and verbs)
stimulate us to create mental images of either entities (objects, persons)
or of events that populate the world, which we are reading about.
It is important to note that the ordering principle governing the
arrangement of the words that form the actual material substrate of
imagined fictional entities is per se non- or pre-chronological: words
read and processed by our brain merely occur in an ordered sequential
progression.
11 This means that prior to chrono-semantic processing
by a reader the string of words that make up a narrative text, as well
as the mental images of objects and events contained in that world,
are ordered only in terms of McTaggart’s C-line.
There are two ways by which these C-line ordered phenomena may
subsequently become ’chrono-logized’, so to speak. In narrative texts
both depend largely (but not exclusively) on temporal operators,
that is, on literal expressions or grammatical and formal features that
can either contain content information on how events and entities
occurring in the represented world are related to each other in terms
of temporal succession (that is, in terms of the B-line principle of
fictional objective time), or they can contain procession instructions
telling us what element of the world to imagine when (articulating the
A-line principle of subjective discourse time). The idea of temporal
operators is best demonstrated by an example. Let us therefore look at
syntactic features that carry
temporal information, most
importantly by temporal
deictic and/or grammatical
tenses.
10 The thrust of McTaggart’s
approach is to prove the
two self-evident concepts
of the A- and the B-line
mutually exclusive by way
of the so-called ‘B-reduction
thesis’, which transforms
A- into B-lines. This paradox
is then used to argue for the
metaphysical non-existence
of time as such. The argument
is of course philosophically
intriguing and has lead to
McTaggart’s continued
popularity in philosophy of
time, triggering refutation
after refutation. See for
example Beer (1988) and
Robinson (1987).
11 Since we are not concerned
with function words and
verbs but merely with
expressions that represent
entities and objectified
events we will ignore the
grammatical, syntactic and
aesthetic ordering principles,
which of course also
organize a narrative text.
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Maelstrom:
We had now reached the summit of the loftiest crag.
For some minutes the old man seemed too much exhausted
to speak. ‘Not long ago,’ said he at length, ‘and I could have
guided you on this route as well as the youngest of my sons;
but, about three years past, there happened to me an event as
never happened before to mortal man—or at least such as no
man ever survived to tell of—and the six hours of deadly terror
which I then endured have broken me up body and soul. You
suppose me a very old man—but I am not. It took less than
a single day to change these hairs from jetty black to white, to
weaken my limbs, and to unstring my nerves, so that I tremble at
the least exertion, and am frightened at a shadow.’5=p4
As in any other case the C-line is originally manifested as a string
of characters ranging from the first to the last ‘w’. Once we begin our
reading and interpret typographic or lexematic units as semantic units
we will identify the C-line at the level of numerically ordered mental
images. We begin to imagine a sequence of entities populating this
world—entities like ‘we’, ‘summit’, ‘crag’ etc. whose lexical representa-
tions (nouns and pronouns) one can parse fairly reliably, ignoring for
the time being the recall problem inherent in any parsing technique.
This C-line as such proves to be inalterable; it can neither be
transformed nor modified. In other words—there are no C-operators
other than paratextual ones.
As is typical for opening paragraphs in narratives our example text
is extremely rich in temporal information. Running along the string
of characters we come across numerous expression that inform us,
either in absolute terms, such as ‘minutes’, ‘years’ or ‘hours’, or by way
of deictic reference to the current temporal position of the hearer or
speaker—‘now’, ‘ago’, ‘at length’, ‘youngest’, ‘past’, ‘never’ and so
forth—about the position or duration of events along an imagined
B-line, that is, the traditional time-line allowing us to understand
which thing occurs before, during or after another. Preciseness and
granularity in these expression—which we have termed B-operators
and marked in bold script—vary considerably. However, they all serve
the same purpose of informing us about what comes before, what
is coexistent, and what comes after. In Poe’s narrative reaching the
summit occurs before witnessing the old man’s exhaustion, and in turn
the event that lead to the man’s sudden ageing happened 3 years before
we reach the summit, and so forth.
A-operators (underlined in the above quote) on the other hand are
typically manifested in the form of a change in grammatical tense or
mode, or as the beginning of a new paragraph, section or chapter.
Whenever this occurs we are called upon to reposition our subjective
now-window and rearrange our mental images of the past, present and
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example is literally denoted by tying the first B-operator—namely the
indexical ‘now’ in the third word—to the past perfect (‘had reached’).
The next A-operator occurs with the switch to the past tense (‘seemed’),
and so forth until we eventually reach a particularly powerful
A-operator in the form of the paragraph mark, which concludes
the fifth sentence. Each of these A-operators serves as a processing
instruction to relocate our now-window. Figure 1 gives a schematic
representation of the first two instances of the now-window, which
we construct as our reading progresses along the C-line. Here the
boundary between now-windows 1 and 2 is demarcated by an
A-operator switch from past perfect to past tense.
However, once we reach the sixth text block we will encounter the
pairing of a temporal flashback (analepsis) indicated on the B-line by
the B-operator expression ‘but, about 3 years past’ with an A-operator
(the switch to the subjunctive and perfect tense). The effect on the
construction and positioning of the next instance of the now-window is
considerable, as Figure 2 demonstrates.
3 Computational implementation of the Model
In terms of our theory the temporality effect is essentially a function of
this interplay of B- and A-line computations in the reader’s mind,
which take place against the background of the static C-line as a frame
Fig. 1 First two instances of the now-window and B-line ordering of successive mental images
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of this theory in a model that is based on computational methodology
requires us to resolve three issues:
(1) Define a mark-up convention and design a mark-up tool that
will enable us to tag the empirical lexical and typographical
elements serving as A- and B-operators within an extended string
of characters—i.e., within a ‘text’.
(2) Define and program two sorting algorithms that can process the
tags, one for handling dynamic B-line computations, a second one
for computing the positions for the changing A-line anchoring
and extension of the ‘now-windows’. Both these computations
take place in relation to the variable C-line delimitation of the
quantity of text string processed.
(3) Identify a visual metaphor, which can adequately represent the
dynamic as well as the multi-dimensional characteristic of tempo-
ral constructs as conceptualized in the temporality effect-model.
3.1 Mark-up convention and tool
Initially our intent was to tag A- and B-operators using standard
TEI-tags (Sperberg-McQueen and Burnard 2002). However, we soon
found that neither the TEI core tag set nor the additional tag sets enable
us to capture the difference between A- and B-operators: the process
Fig. 2 Repositioning of the now-window effected by A-operator in text block 6
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with that of ‘temporal expression’, which underlies the concept of
standard TEI tag sets and is at base denotational. What comes much
closer to meeting our model’s requirements are the so-called TEI
feature structure tags, which are basically a form of user-definable
notational convention that can be expanded into as many parameters
as one wishes. We therefore decided to adopt the feature-structure
concept and put it into practice in terms of a data-base approach.
In the next step we developed the prototype of a mark-up tool
called TempusMarker.
12 As the name suggests, TempusMarker assists
the mark-up of A- and B-operators in narrative texts. TempusMarker
is a stand-alone application, which does not write a full tag into the
actual string, but rather inserts a unique placeholder for every defined
tag. This short tag ID refers to an external data base file, which contains
the fully expanded tag definition.
Actual tagging with TempusMarker is done in a two-step approach.
In the pre-processing mode we identify any potential temporal operator
by highlighting it in the text and marking it as either an A- or a
B-operator, without further expanding its definition. For example, the
first ‘now’ in Poe’s novella is simply marked as 5B4now5/B4 to
indicate its function as a B-operator. At a later stage of development,
a part of this pre-processing routine will be handled automatically by a
parser that can identify common temporal expressions. Manual tagging
will nevertheless remain a necessity because of metaphorical use
of language in literary narratives, which a parser simply cannot
resolve. TempusMarker is programmed to store all relevant terms and
definitions defined during any manual tagging in an automatically
updated and dynamic lexicon file, which will be consulted by the
eventual pre-processing parsing routine. Figure 3 presents the
TempusMarker interface for the pre-processing routine.
Once pre-processing of the text has been completed the prelimi-
nary tags can then be expanded or re-defined. This is supported by
TempusMarker’s post-processing interface (Figure 4), which enables
the user to specify seven parameters, and automatically supplies values
for a further five parameters, which are required for the identification
of tags and the extension of the text string, which they refer to, as well
as for the versioning of single- and multi-user tagging protocols.
The five automatically instantiated parameters are displayed in the
bottom row of text boxes (a); they are (from left to right)
(1) Unique Tag-ID (1);
(2) string position of the first and last characters of the mark-up area
(11, 13);
(3) Version Number, identifying the tagging session per user;
(4) User-ID, identifying the user who is tagging the text.
The (b) row of combo- and text boxes contains the actual semantic
parameters that expand the initial tag; these include among others the
basic temporal parameters suggested by Po ¨ppel (1978) and Habel and
12 The current TempusMarker
prototype is available for
download at http://
www.jcmeister.de/html/
tempusmarker1.html.
TempusMarker is
programmed in
VisualBasic 6.0 and runs
under Windows 98 and
above.
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tag to the next with the help of two search buttons, the user can now
define the following (from left to right):
(1) the class of textual expression: lexematic (a word), grammatical
(a tense or mode), structural (e.g. a paragraph mark), rhetorical
(e.g. a repetition, an analepsis etc.);
(2) the type of operator: A- or B-operator. This allows the user to
override the pre-processing definition if necessary;
Fig. 3 Pre-processing of electronic text with TempusMarker
Fig. 4 Post-processing of electronic text with TempusMarker
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Literary and Linguistic Computing, Vol. 20, Suppl Issue, 2005 117(3) the mode in which temporal information is conveyed: absolute
(e.g. a date) or relative (e.g. a deictic reference like ‘at the same
time’);
(4) the temporal value: ‘before, after, while, at, starts, finishes’;
(5) the granularity of the expression: ‘instant, second, minute, hour,
day, week, month, year, generation, epoch, vague’;
(6) an optional numerical value;
(7) a potential reference tag to which the current expression is
relationally tied. Reference tags can be identified either explicitly
or indirectly by highlighting any relevant piece of actual text and
confirming the selection with the ‘accept’-button. Should this
string not yet contain an explicit tag, it will either take on the
value of the preceding tag, or that of a tag supplied at a later stage.
When sufficient parameters have been defined we generate the actual
tag by clicking the relevant button. The tag will now be shown for
inspection in text box (c). If it is found to be correct its tag-ID can then
be inserted into the actual text (d) by clicking the ‘InsertþSave’-button.
The tag-ID will be displayed here while the full tag is automatically
stored in an external tag-file, which from now on remains associated
with the actual text file.
Finally, the large text box at the bottom of the interface (e) lists all
new, as well as the previously defined full tags, which are automatically
read in from the associated tag-file. Tag-IDs and fully expanded tags
stored in the external file are cross-referenced so that mousing over
a Tag-ID will automatically display the full tag. Clicking on a full
tag displayed in the bottom text box (e) will result in highlighting the
tag-ID within the actual text. There is no limitation to the number of
tags per string area marked, or on the complexity or expansion of text
highlighted in the tag reference field. Different users may decide to tag
the same portion of text using entirely different operators or qualifiers;
tags may overlap extensively and so forth. In short, TempusMarker
does not insist on unambiguousness of mark-up—indeed, it is designed
to place as little restrictions as possible on the semantic content of
temporal mark-up while making sure that the mark-up syntax is
consistently applied.
3.2 Analysis of A- and B-line ordering
Readers familiar with logical programming languages may have noticed
that the expanded TempusMarker tag, which we defined for the first
occurrence of ‘now’ in Poe’s A Descent into the Maelstrom takes on the
form of a syntactically correct Prolog clause:
t_op(1,11,13, Version-No., User-ID, lexematic, b_operator,
relative, at, instant, present, ‘reached the summit of the loftiest
crag. For some minutes the old man’)
Similar to Burg et al. (2000) we are using a logic programming
approach in the analytical modelling component of our project, the
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will mainly consist of two sorting algorithms, written in Prolog, which
can perform a combinatorial analysis of the tag material stored in the
external tag-file and order it, and thereby also the text blocks delimited
by these operators, in terms of A- and B-operator information. These
algorithms are termed the A- and B-algorithm.
The strength of combinatorial analyses with Prolog (which also
plays a fundamental methodological role in my approach toward the
combinatorial analysis and exploration of narrated action structures;
see Meister (2003)) lies in the fact that one can generate all possible
(i.e. rule conformant) permutations, however deeply nested these
combinatorial structures may turn out to be. Unlike Burg et al. (2000)
our approach does not presuppose an explicit declaration of temporal
facts as such (i.e. of the temporal location of represented events) in
Prolog syntax. We will leave this task to the machine by instructing it to
find out where the content of a text block rendered between two
successive temporal operators can be temporally positioned. The
semantic ‘richness’ and extension of these text blocks will be measured
in terms of the number of mental images of objects, events and ideas,
which are contained within a given block. Again, since we do not want
to burden the user with tagging mental images we are also developing a
parser that can automatically tag prepositions and nouns (i.e. the
lexical elements, which normally represent object or event entities) in
our example texts, using either a text-specific thesaurus generated by a
concordancer, or—in the case of German language narratives—relying
on the capitalisation of nouns and proper names.
Perhaps the most important methodological aspect of TempusParser
is that both B-line order and A-line values will be generated ‘on the fly’
and in relation to a user-defined C-line position on the character
string. This resembles the ‘continuous model now-slider’ approach in
Drucker and Nowvieskie (2003), but is conceptually slightly different
in that in terms of our model, the now-window is already a dynamic
readerly construct, which the Prolog A-algorithm will have to identify,
and not a simple user-defined variable. The envisaged combination of
the two combinatory Prolog algorithms ultimately aims at a dynamic
and explorative model that can visualize what a reader, after processing
a specific amount of textual material, and on the basis of a certain
interpretation of the temporal operators contained therein, can ideally
know about the evolving temporal structure of events, and about
the temporal location of object perceptions that take place within the
represented world. Moreover, by way of locating and measuring the
varying extension of the successive now-windows we also hope to
be able to visualize to a certain extent how one knows what one
knows about the fictional world’s temporality, and how the extent
and granularity of this temporal knowledge changes throughout the
processing of representational material. Finally, assuming that the
mark-up of temporal operators can be objectified to a sufficient extent
our model would ultimately also be able to measure and compare
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that contribute to the temporality effect, thereby identifying the
temporal profile specific to a text or text corpus. The overall
architecture of the two interacting programs TempusMarker and
TempusParser is outlined in Figure 5.
3.3. Dynamic visualization of the temporality effect
The visualization of the dynamically generated views onto the
narrated world should ideally combine a graphic representation of
the subjective now-window with one for the fictitious objective
temporal ordering of events and occurrences in the narrated
world. The subjective now-window is defined in terms of the reader’s
present notion of his or her cognitive position in an A-line continuum
of past–present–future, as well as in terms of the extension of that
now-window as measured by the number of mental images contained
therein. The objective temporal order is expressed in terms of indi-
vidual events’ and occurrences’ positioning in the B-line continuum
of before–while–after. Accordingly, our suggestion is to interpret the
dimensions of McTaggart’s model (A-, B- and C-line) as the axes of
a 3D model. We are currently investigating the feasibility of a 3D
visualisation, which we have tentatively named the ‘rock face model
of time’ (Figure 6).
In terms of the ‘rock face’ metaphor the temporality effect—that is,
our combined experience of subjective time and objective temporal
succession made on the basis of a narrative representation of a fictional
world—is a process that resembles the sampling of changing aspects
of a mountain range as we walk along that range, eventually deciding
to climb it.
Imagine your now-window is located in the horizontal and vertical
centre of such a ridge. Let us assume that the bottom layers of the
range are the oldest, and that the ridge is located in the future
of the mountain range (which is, of course, the opposite of what
geomorphology teaches us). This vertical axis visualizes the B-line. Now
imagine that you have decided to climb the mountain following
a diagonal route from bottom left to top right; this is your subjective
A-line. Your subjective now-window is defined in relation to these
three axes. From its position and depending on the gradient and the
contours as well as on the texture of the rock face in its various places
(equivalent to the changing quality and quantity of the mental images
in a narrative, and of the temporal operators encountered) you will be
able to see a sharp pinnacle here, a deep gully there, then a saddle and
so forth. Whenever you move to the right or the left, the vista will
change, because you are now on a different vertical section of the rock
face; whenever you climb higher or lower, the same will occur because
you can see more of the entire mountain range the higher you climb.
Like all analogies the rock face metaphor is of course somewhat
forced, and like all visualizations it carries the risk of suggestiveness.
We will have to await the outcome of our current experiments
J. C. Meister
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adequately represent the dynamically changing aspects of a narrated
world’s temporal organisation. These visualisations will have to be
generated from the twofold output of TempusParser: from the logic
B-line constructs that represent successive instances of the narrated
world’s state expressed in terms of temporally ordered fictional events
and occurrences—the story (fabula)—and from the A-line constructs
that represent the successive instances of the discursive process by
which these B-line representations themselves were generated, that is,
from the dynamic model of the narrative’s plot (sujet).
4 Conclusion
Our quote from Poe’s A Descent into the Maelstrom lacks the conclusive
statement of the first paragraph. I believe that it has a certain bearing
on our project, and particularly on the rock face model of time:
‘‘Do you know I can scarcely look over this little cliff without getting
giddy?’’
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